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James Boyd White

The Cultural Background
of The Legal Imagination
I want to speak in this essay about one aspect of the origins of what is often called the law and literature movement in the United States,1 namely,
how it got going. I shall do this by explaining the aims and assumptions
of my own early contribution to it in the form of The Legal Imagination
(first published in 1973). What I say will thus have some of the features of
autobiography, but I hope it will be plain that this story is not really about
me but about the state of the culture in which modern law and literature
emerged.
At the time this book was written there was very little that connected
the law with the literary humanities in a self-conscious way. But any claim
that law and humanities began in 1973 would obviously be ludicrous, for
the connections between law and the arts oflanguage go all the way back
to the beginnings of law in European history. The lawyer was, for the
Greek and Roman alike, in large measure a rhetorician. Rhetoric was the
center of European education until at least the seventeenth century, and
long after that it was believed that a good education in the humanistic past
was essential to excellence in law. The institution of the university began
with schools of law, in Bologna and elsewhere, and law was seen to be
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naturally connected to philosophy, history, philology, ;111d theology (e.g.,
see Gilmore).
In the nineteenth .md much of the twentieth century, it would have
been obvious to most lawyers that they \\-ere speakers and writers by occupation, that law itself was a br,111ch of the larger culture ( sec i-:crguson,
Law). One need look no further than Justicc frankfurter's famous advice
to a twelve-year-old boy who wished to become a lawyer:
My dear Paul:
No one can be a truly competent l.1wycr unless he is ,l cultiv,ncd man.
If! were you, I would forget all .1bout anv tcchnic.11 prcpar,nion for the
law. The best w.1y to prcp.m: for the law is to come to the study of the
law as a well-read person. Thus alone can one .Kquirc the capacitv to
use the English language on paper .md in speech and with the habits
of clear thinking which only a truly liberal education can give. No less
important for a lawyer is the cultivation of the imaginative faculties by
reading poetry, seeing great paintings, in the original or in c,1sily available reproductions, and listening to great music. Stock your mind with
the deposit of much good reading, and widen and deepen your feelings
by experiencing vicariously as much as possible the wonderfi.il mysteries
of the universe, and forget all about your future career.
With good wishes,
Sincerely yours,
[swned] Felix Frankfurter
( qtd. in E. London, Law 725)

It is really only in the rather odd intellectual climate of the midtwentieth century and beyond that it would have been possible to think
that the law had no connection with the other arts of language and disciplines of thought we normally think of as constituting the humanities. In
my view, this blindness to the obvious was produced by a convergence of a
set of influences: in philosophy, the kind of logical positivism that wanted
to reduce meaning to the empirically testable; the more general view that
science simply eclipses the value of other forms of thought ( and with it the
desire to claim the status of "science" for the study of social, political, and
economic phenomena); a widespread desire at a time of international peril
to affirm the masculinity of science against the perceived femininity of the
humanities; and the self-conscious turn to what is called social science in
the law, first in the form of sociology and psychology, then of economics.
The assumptions here were that these fields could produce knowledge of a
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sort that the humanities could not; that this knowledge was testable; and
that it could be the foundation of law-law based upon social realities
that were accurately represented by disciplines that shared the name, and
hoped to share the prestige, of science. The idea that law could be seen as
one of the social sciences became prevalent in the 1930s, under the rubric
of legal realism, and it has since grown more intense.
I will return to this way of thinking in just a moment. My point now
is a simpler one, that when I and others began to think of connecting the
law with the world of humanities and literature, what we were doing was
not something new and shocking, though that is how some saw it and
perhaps how it felt to us, but something very old-fashioned indeed. We
were seeking to make conscious a tradition that went back to the beginnings of legal thought in the West. But this was a tradition that took itself
largely for granted, and there was very little that addressed it directly. By
the time I was in law school in the early 1960s, for example, there were
only a scattering of contemporary pieces explicitly about the connections
between law and literature: an essay by Justice Cardozo ("Law" 3-52); a
fine article on judicial style by Walker Gibson; a popular anthology compiled by Ephraim London ( World); and important work by Owen Barfield
(see Tennyson 56), an English lawyer (of whose work at the time I was
unfortunately not aware). But it is fair to say that there was no widespread
drive to connect the activities oflaw with what could be learned from our
humanistic past. Thus to look at the law, as I wished to do, as an art of
thought and language, with its own characteristic concerns and methods,
was simultaneously old-fashioned and newfangled, surprising to almost
everyone.
I was often asked-as you may want to ask- What can literature possibly have to do with law? This question, repeated over and over again as
I began my work, and indeed since then too, reflects in my view a deep
misunderstanding of the nature of both literature and law, sometimes on
the part of those who profess one or the other. 2
In order to speak about the way in which connections between these
two fields of activity can be drawn, by showing how they were in fact
drawn in my own early work, I shall need to speak about my own education, in law school and before. For my ways of imagining the law and the
literature that I was interested in connecting were to a large degree shaped
by the ways in which I was taught these things both at the university and
in the practice of law. My vision of law and literature, that is, was based
upon a particular idea of what law is, or can be, as well as a certain idea of
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what literature is, and what cm be k.1rned from it. I slull bq,;in b,· trving
to explain these two ide.1s, tr.King them out in term~ ofnw t:duc.1tion-.111
education that made it both surprising to connect these .1pparentlv diftcrent things and at the same time, by .1 sort ofp.1r.1dox, quitt: .1 n.1tural thing
to do.
I shall begin with what "litnatun:" me.mt to one t:duc.1tt:d .1s I ,yas. In
college I studied mainly Grct:k and English liter.Hurt:. (;reek cxpost:d me
to the wondcrfi.11 works that arc a\'ailabk only in that l.mguagc - Homer,
Plato, Euripides, and Sophocles-and introduo:d me to the rc.1lity oflanguagc difference itself. One docs not and cannot think the s.11nt: w.1y in
Greek and in English. In each of these languages one can do .md say things
that one cannot in the other, for each expresses its own culture-its own
values, its own sense of what should count as reason, its own way of imagining or constituting the social and natural worlds. Tht: study of other
languages has always been central to the humanities, and fr>r good reason:
it teaches us that the ways we think, our ways of imagining ourselves and
the world we inhabit, are not the only ways. The study of other languages
puts into question our own language and the assumptions implicit in it;
in doing so, it makes possible a certain kind of cultural criticism, one that
holds out the possibility of growth beyond the taken-for-granteds of our
own world. 3 For me the study of Greek held this kind of promise, and
when I turned to law, it was natural for me to regard law as a language too,
as one way among many of doing things with words.
As for the study of English literature, I was trained in the close reading
of literary texts, especially poems, a kind of reading sometimes spoken of
as the New Criticism. The main idea of this kind of work is that what happens in language, especially in artful language like that of the best poems,
can be enormously complex and important, and this in several dimensions
simultaneously: aesthetically, intellectually, emotionally, ethically, even politically. We learned that the meaning of a literary expression is not statable
in the form of a proposition or an idea but lies in the complex experience of
engagement with it, an experience that has its own shape and significance
and that can be apprehended only by a mind and imagination trained to
observe and respond to such things. 4 We believed that understanding a
literary expression of the best kind requires the highest and most complete
intelligence. In this sense, learning to read and judge the best literature
was thought to be an education of the whole mind, and a worthy goal for
a whole life.
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Built into this process was the activity of judgment. We would argue
endlessly about the merits of a poem or novel or the style of a prose writer.
Is this a really good poem or story or sentence, or is it flawed, defective,
weak? Is it somehow great despite its flaws-or even because of them? This
judgment was not merely an aesthetic one: the question mainly had to do
with the quality of thought and imagination, its comprehensiveness and
truthfulness, its openness to contrasting truths, its capacity for new and living speech, and this on the most important of human topics: war and death,
love and art, truth and knowledge, meaning and meaninglessness. 5 The
literary judgment was thus also an ethical one, sometimes a political one.
It was a premise of our work that to read well required one to write
well. The quality of our own expressions mattered supremely, we were
taught, for it is in the quality of one's expression that one demonstrates,
for good or ill, the quality of one's mind, of one's imagination, of one's
education; this is where one shows how far one has realized, or failed to
realize, the possibilities for meaning that distinguish human life.
In this way we came to see that literature was not to be regarded
merely as an item of high consumption, like fine wine, or as an elegance of
life, but lay at the center of our own imaginative and expressive lives: for
we, like the writers we read, could collapse into empty cliches, sentimental
slogans, or the vices of advertising or propaganda; or, like them, we could
try to find ways to use our language to say things worthy of respect. This
sense of the danger and power of language was to be of great help to me
when it came to the study of law.
I loved this kind of engagement with language and literature, but when
I went to graduate school, with the idea of becoming a professor of English, I found that there ( unlike my college) literature was seen as a field
of activity set apart from ordinary life, and from politics and ethics as well.
To put it in a word, the reading of literature was professionalized, and
for me that threatened its value. So I decided not to make my life simply
as a reader of literature but to go to law school instead, with the object
of becoming a lawyer. I naturally imagined the legal education I sought
as learning to read and write well the language of the law, which was of
course a language of power. Without quite knowing it, I was discovering
that the study of literature needed the law, just as I was soon to discover
that the law needed literature.
As you can see, I already had an idea of what the law was-an activity
of mind and language-and it was not one widely shared in the general
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culture. It was and is common for nonlawn:rs .md nc\\· b\\' students alike
to think of the law simply as a system of rules, sometimes c.1st in r.1ther
technical and arcane terms. On such a Yicw, a legal education consists
mainly of learning the rules, including \\'here necessary the special me.ming of the terms of art in \\'hich they are expressed. The applic.1tion of the
rules is thought to be simple enough: one looks at the world to sec whether
the rule applies or does not, then makes one's commonsense judgment.
What sets the lawyer apart from other people is his or her knowledge of
the rules and where to find them. Of course there may be problems in interpretation and application, but these arc not very interesting and can be
handled by rough common sense. What matters on this Yicw is the system
of law itself; its purposes and its coherence, matters that can be thought
about largely in terms established by sociology or political science or even
economICs.
In an American law school of my era much energy was devoted to
upsetting this simplistic vision of law. Of course rules can be applied in a
nonproblematic way a good bit of the time, we were taught, but that is
not where lawyers and judges spend their time. They focus on problems
of meaning, and these are constantly before us. In any legal case that gets
very far, it will be possible to make competing and contrasting arguments
about the meaning both of the facts and of the law, arguments that are
rational, coherent, and have persuasive force. The defendant and plaintiff
will maintain opposing views, with considerable power; judges will concur
and dissent, again often with good reasons on both sides.
The world of law-I speak especially of American law-is thus not
a world of authoritarian clarity, not a world in which a system works itself
out automatically, but a world of deep uncertainty and openness, of tension and conflict and argument, a world where reasons do not harmonize
but oppose one another. This means that it is a world of learning and invention, where a great premium is placed on one's ability to make sense of
an immense body of material as it bears on a particular case.
To learn to "think like a lawyer" was said to be the aim of law school.
This activity was imagined as highly complex, comprehensive, exploratory
and tentative, open to alternatives, subtle, and mature. Learning to think
well in this mode was regarded as a proper object of an education, indeed
of a life-just as at college I had been taught that learning to think well
about literary texts, in literary ways, could be the object of a life. In both
cases it was the quality of one's thought and expression that mattered
above all.
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This is what my legal education was to be like. But, as I suggest earlier, no one seemed to be consciously aware that this education was fundamentally literary and rhetorical in kind, with something to learn from
other arts of language and culture. The law was seen as sui generis, its
own unique cultural form with its own inherent intellectual and ethical
merits. 6
Much to my surprise, then, my literary training was of real and practical
value both in the study of law and, later on, in the practice of law. I was
used to the close reading of texts; used to seeing in one composition or
expression a range of possible meanings; used to arguing for one reading
as dominant, against the reality of other possibilities; and, perhaps above
all, used to seeing both in written and oral expressions performances of
mind and imagination that could be done well or badly. In other words,
there was from the beginning a natural point of connection for me between these two forms of activity and life, the reading of literary texts and
the practices of law. 7
I was prepared too, as I say above, to make judgments, both intellectual and ethical in nature, about what people said or wrote. Just as a poem
might be condemned as sentimental and a history as a string of received
ideas, so a legal argument might be dismissed as conclusory or a judicial
opinion as simply the unexamined reiteration of platitudes. Just as in literature we were trained to judge quality in a poem or novel, in law school
we were being trained to see the vast differences between the good lawyer
and the poor one, the good judge and the poor one-differences that
made themselves apparent especially in what these people said, in the ways
in which they thought and spoke, in the texts they produced.
This view of things was borne out by my experience in law practice,
where I was faced directly with the questions, What is excellence in the
practice of law? How can I best try to attain it? In thinking about these
matters I found myself attending, over and over, to what the best lawyers
in our firm did and said with language, trying to understand what they
were doing and why. The secret of their intellectual and professional quality to a large degree lay there, I thought, in what they found it possible to
say, if only I could learn to see it.
It seemed to me that the lawyer was asked again and again to address
what I would call a literary moment, a moment in which the very question
he or she was addressing was one of meaning: the meaning of the experience of a client or witness or opposing party; the meaning of a piece of
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testimony; the meaning of a \\'ord or phr.1se in ,1 st.ltute or contract; and
behind all these things the meaning of the tlucn1.1ting .rnd um:ntain mass
of documents, principles, understandings, and crnwentions \\'l'. call the law.
To a very large degree it was the lawyer who \\'as gi\'en the task of making
that meaning and doing it \\'ell.
For me, then, the law \\'as abo\'e .111 an .1etivity of mind and language,
with all that involved, an acti\'ity that in\'ited comparison with other such
activities, especially with the best works of our literary tradition, where we
might find examples of the most important kinds of success. The center
oflegal education, as I saw it, was the opportunity it afforded to stri\'e for
excellence of thought and expression alike. The good lawyer, the good
judge, were marked by a capacity for a kind of whole-minded attention
and thought, one object of which was to transform oneself into a wiser
and more acute intelligence.
One of the premises of law as I learned it was that good and decent
people can respectably and respectfully disagree about the outcome properly required by the law. What this means is that excellence, for lawyer and
judge alike, is not to be confused with choosing the right result; it lies
instead in the process of thought and imagination by which one articulates
one's questions and thinks one's way through to one's conclusions. One
could admire greatly a judge with whom one habitually disagreed and
have deep contempt for one who normally voted like oneself. 8
How then are we to think about the set of activities of mind and language
the lawyer and judge must master? The answer of the law school in which
I grew up was, simply by learning to do them. This was a kind of craft
teaching. It was perhaps not thought necessary or even interesting to find
a more explicit way of thinking about what we were doing,9 but that was
what I wanted to do and tried to do in The Legal Imagination. My hope in
this book was to develop a way of thinking about the activities of mind and
imagination that lie at the heart oflaw-at what happens when a lawyer
or judge is faced with a real problem in the world, a loss or conflict, and
seeks to bring to bear upon it the language of the law. 10
My method was to use a series of questions and writing assignments
to ask the student to function both as a lawyer, speaking the language
of the law, and in the other ways in which he or she had competence by
education and experience. In the class we then looked at what the student
produced with the eyes of the sort of legal and literary critic I had been
trained to be, asking questions about the nature and limits of the language
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used, the ways in which it has been replicated or transformed, the quality
of mind revealed in the activity of thought and writing, and the ethical
perils and opportunities it represented.
One persistent question had to do with the language of the law, which
the student must as a lawyer both speak and write: is it necessarily dead,
formulaic, mechanical, empty (as it surely is in some hands); or is it-can
it by art be made to be-alive, full of meaning and significance? To achieve
this, the student must make his or her language the object of thought and
attention, accept the responsibility for the use and transformation of it,
and resist the human desire to collapse uncritically into its forms.
The idea of the book is in this way to set up an internal dialogue in
the student's head between the "law" the student is learning and whatever
else he or she knows and is. As a way into these tensions I use both literature and ordinary language, but it could be anything of which the student
has command, from music to mathematics to baseball or farming.
Using this method, the book considers a range of questions and problems. How in a general way can one compare legal and literary expressions? How does the law work as a system of meaning and social con struction? How does the lawyer's argument-the language, the way of
thinking-change as he or she addresses different audiences? How should
statutes be composed and interpreted? How should the law talk about human beings, especially in the insanity defense, in sentencing judgments, in
institutions of various kinds, and in the language of race? How is the law
used, for good or ill, to build human relations over time, to structure social expectations, to instill values that will guide discretion? How do judges
and lawyers reason, and how should we decide whether a particular act of
legal reasoning is good or bad? How can we understand and criticize the
form ofliterature we call the judicial opinion? At the end, I shift emphasis,
asking the student to think of the law itself in a metaphorical way: Is it a
kind of poetry, of rhetoric, of history? Here the students have to find their
own ways of talking.
In all of this the student has been asked to think oflegal language and
legal education as dangers: oflegal language as potentially narrow and technical and dull, as excluding from consideration virtually everything that
matters, and as founded on a form, the rule, in which the truth can never
be said; and oflegal education as habituating the student to this language,
making his or her mind the servant of the language rather than the other
way round. These are real problems, and worth thinking about. My hope
was that as the student came to see that the life of the lawyer is a life of
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writing and speech, of expression, of the arts of language, he or she would
come to see it also as presenting opportunities of a unique kind-for what
can be done with legal language cannot be done with anything else-and
to recognize that the lite it offers can be one foll of interest and importance and value, at least if he or she can make it so.
Notes
Another version of this essay appears in longer form in Tmchin_rr Law in the
Mirror of Literature, edited by Barbara Pozzo (2010).
1. I need to say tlut this name is itself in question: sometimes people spe,1k
of "law and the humanities," sometimes of "l.1w and language," sometimes of
"law, culture, and humanities." WhateYer term is used, the kinds of work being
done under this general rubric vary greatly in genre and intention alike. There is
no organized program here, no commitment to an ideology, no plan of conquest.
Rather, as is consistent with the nature of literature itself, and of the hum.rnities,
the idea is that many flowers may bloom, different in shape and color. This means,
among other things, that we cannot talk meaningfully about the promise or limits
of something called "law and literature" as if it were a program based on a set of
shared assumptions that necessarily shaped its productions. The kind of criticism
called for here is not in that sense theoretical, not a global affirmation or rejection,
but, like the work in question itself, particular in nature.
2. Richard A. Posner's Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation seems
to me in particular to misunderstand both law and literature. Posner finds that he
can learn nothing from his reading of Homer, Shakespeare, and the rest except
tricks for manipulating others through language, an unfortunate consequence of
his own habits of reading that in my view says nothing about the works with which
he finds he cannot valuably engage. See my review of this book, "What Can a
Lawyer Learn from Literature?"
3. The view of language and culture I sketch here is elaborated in my book
When Words Lose Their Meaning. The point about language difference, and the art
of reading and translation it requires, is developed in my Justice as Translation.
4. For a classic statement of this thesis, see C. Brooks.
5. The common idea that literature is somehow merely aesthetic in character, as though there were no substantive concerns in our greatest literature, is
demonstrably wrong. The Iliad and Aeneid are about war, Dante's Commedia
and Milton's Paradise Lost about the justice of God, Keats's "On a Grecian Urn"
about art and time, Herbert's "Pulley" about the creation of man, Dickens's Bleak
House about social injustice, Austen's Mansfield Park about human morality, and
so on. What is true is that these works have their own ways of treating their subject,
which is not that of the modern academic book or article, but in fact far harder to
achieve and of far greater significance.
6. How about social science? We were told that social science had much to
offer the law, mainly in the form of reliable findings about the world. The idea was
that, up until the moment at which modern social science made something else
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possible, the law had had to rely on necessarily intuitive judgments about human
behavior and motivation, on tradition and culture. Now psychology, sociology,
and economics could provide a kind of scientific knowledge of the world on which
legislatures and courts could rely in the formulation of rules and judgments. This
was, and is, in my view completely unobjectionable. Of course the law should learn
what it can about the world, from whatever reliable source. This is no threat to law,
because law will in the end be the forum in which the reliability of the findings of
social science will be debated and determined, just as is the case with other forms
of expert testimony. The law will translate what can be said in these other ways into
its own discourse and use them for its own purposes.
7. Let me add a point. To a certain kind of mind, the question in reading is
simply to ask what is the main idea. But in law, as in poetry and other forms ofliterature, the main idea is usually rather simply stated and it is not the real point. The
poet is saying I am in love or full of grief or in despair; the First Amendment says
speech is a good thing, the Fourth Amendment says people are to be protected
against searches, and so on. But you could write a book, or teach a whole course,
about the significance of the ways in which Shakespeare says in his sonnets that he is
in love or despair; likewise, you could write a book or teach a whole course about
the ways in which speech is protected under the First Amendment. Life and quality
are in the style, not imagined simply as a form of elegance, but as all that matters
most when one uses language.
8. Contemporary interest in the quality of legal thought is well expressed
in the preface to the first volume of the distinguished journal the Supreme Court
Review: "In many recent comments on the Court and its critics, the point has been
made that, in the words of Professor Henry Hart, 'neither at the bar nor among
the faculties oflaw schools is there an adequate tradition of sustained, disinterested,
and competent criticism of the professional qualities of the Court's opinions.' It
is believed that one of the reasons for this deficiency has been the absence of a
publication devoted exclusively to the presentation of such criticism. This annual,
then, proposes to fill the gap by providing a forum in which the best minds in the
field will be encouraged freely to express their critical judgments. Over and over
again, justices of the Supreme Court have announced the desirability of, indeed
the necessity for, such critiques of their work. It is hoped that The Supreme Court
Review will meet that need" (Preface).
9. One important effort to be self-conscious about the law was the fine course
taught by Albert Sacks and Henry Hart, The Legal Process. Their materials have
since been published by Foundation Press.
10. For more recent reflections on teaching law, see my From Expectation to
Experience.

